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ABSTRACT
Emergency﻿and﻿rescue﻿operations﻿are﻿often﻿carried﻿out﻿in﻿areas﻿where﻿the﻿network﻿infrastructure﻿




















The﻿nature﻿of﻿emergency﻿and﻿rescue﻿operations﻿ imply﻿ that﻿providing﻿ information﻿security﻿ is﻿
a﻿prerequisite﻿for﻿MANETs﻿to﻿be﻿used﻿in﻿such﻿situations﻿(Meissner,﻿Luckenbach,﻿Risse,﻿Kirste,﻿&﻿
Kirchner,﻿2002,﻿Dearlove,﻿2004).﻿Unlike﻿the﻿general-purpose﻿MANET,﻿a﻿first﻿responder﻿MANET﻿
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access﻿ control﻿ based﻿on﻿ authorised﻿node﻿descriptions.﻿To﻿ efficiently﻿provide﻿ confidentiality,﻿ our﻿
protocol﻿extension﻿also﻿includes﻿a﻿link﻿encryption﻿scheme﻿utilising﻿dynamically﻿established﻿symmetric﻿













Attempts﻿ to﻿ secure﻿ routing﻿ in﻿MANETs﻿have﻿mostly﻿ been﻿done﻿by﻿ specifying﻿ extensions﻿ to﻿ the﻿
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a﻿Message﻿Authentication﻿Code﻿ (MAC)﻿ or﻿ digital﻿ signature﻿ for﻿ each﻿ intermediate﻿ node.﻿ The﻿
protocol﻿also﻿proposes﻿the﻿use﻿of﻿the﻿Timed﻿Efficient﻿Stream﻿Loss-tolerant﻿Authentication﻿(TESLA)﻿
broadcast﻿authentication﻿mechanism﻿(Perrig,﻿Canetti,﻿Tygar,﻿&﻿Song,﻿2002)﻿for﻿intermediate﻿hop﻿
authentication﻿ and﻿ shared﻿ secret﻿ for﻿ endpoint﻿ authentication.﻿ The﻿TESLA﻿mechanism﻿ utilizes﻿
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By﻿detecting﻿and﻿ reacting﻿upon﻿misbehaving﻿nodes﻿ the﻿probability﻿of﻿ correct﻿ functioning﻿of﻿ the﻿
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Table 1. Comparison of proposed secure MANET protocols
Protocol Availability Confidentiality Integrity Authentication Non-Repudation Assumptions
Ariadne Yes No Yes Yes No Established﻿PKI﻿or﻿shared﻿secret﻿keys
SRP Yes No Yes Yes No Established﻿shared﻿secret﻿keys
SAODV Yes No Yes Yes Yes Established﻿PKI
ARAN Yes No Yes Yes Yes Established﻿PKI
SLSP Yes No Yes Yes Yes Established﻿PKI
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Table 2. Examples of identified attacks
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The﻿ current﻿ predominant﻿ communication﻿ paradigm﻿ for﻿ first﻿ responders﻿ is﻿ voice﻿
communication﻿ over﻿ radio﻿ networks﻿ (e.g.﻿TETRA).﻿MANETS﻿will﻿ enable﻿ distribution﻿ of﻿
rich﻿ content﻿ in﻿ uni-,﻿multi-﻿ or﻿ broadcast﻿mode.﻿ In﻿ addition﻿ to﻿ user﻿ nodes,﻿we﻿ envisage﻿ a﻿
command﻿post﻿ that﻿ is﻿operated﻿ from﻿a﻿ specialised﻿vehicle﻿and﻿possess﻿greater﻿computing﻿
resources.﻿In﻿situations﻿where﻿external﻿communication﻿infrastructure﻿is﻿available,﻿both﻿the﻿

























and﻿ regions﻿ must﻿ be﻿ allowed﻿ to﻿ participate﻿ and﻿ collaborate﻿ without﻿ compromising﻿ the﻿
security﻿of﻿the﻿network.﻿This﻿makes﻿key﻿management﻿for﻿authentication﻿and﻿access﻿control﻿
in﻿particular,﻿a﻿troublesome﻿task.
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The﻿authentication﻿mechanism﻿of﻿our﻿protocol﻿ is﻿based﻿on﻿X.509﻿certificates﻿ (Cooper﻿ et﻿ al.,﻿
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Figure 1. Key establishment process
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5.1. Message Formats and Processing
All﻿existing﻿OLSR﻿messages﻿such﻿as﻿TC﻿and﻿HELLO﻿messages﻿are﻿distributed﻿in﻿broadcast﻿mode﻿













Figure 2. General encrypted message format encapsulating HELLO and TC messages
Figure 3. Challenge message format
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5.2. Information Bases
We﻿extend﻿ the﻿ information﻿ bases﻿ for﻿OLSR﻿ to﻿ include﻿ link﻿ keys,﻿ node﻿ descriptions﻿ and﻿ access﻿
level.﻿The﻿link﻿set﻿tuple﻿is﻿extended﻿to﻿include﻿local﻿and﻿neighbour﻿key﻿identifiers﻿(L_local_KID,﻿





Figure 4. Response message format
Figure 5. KEY message format
Figure 6. TC message format after decryption
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The﻿topology﻿information﻿base﻿is﻿extended﻿with﻿a﻿new﻿Node﻿Description﻿Set,﻿where﻿each﻿
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certificates﻿ and﻿ exchanged﻿when﻿nodes﻿ connect﻿ to﻿ each﻿other.﻿The﻿descriptions﻿ are﻿ then﻿ further﻿
distributed﻿throughout﻿the﻿network,﻿through﻿control﻿messages﻿of﻿the﻿underlying﻿link﻿state﻿unicast﻿
routing﻿ protocol.﻿We﻿ have﻿ defined﻿ three﻿major﻿ classifications﻿ (i.e.﻿ descriptions)﻿ based﻿ on﻿ the﻿
organisation﻿to﻿which﻿the﻿nodes﻿belong;﻿fire,﻿police﻿and﻿medic.
CAM﻿ relies﻿ on﻿ limited﻿ scope﻿ flooding﻿ for﻿message﻿ propagation,﻿which﻿ introduces﻿ serious﻿
transmission﻿overhead﻿and﻿also﻿makes﻿it﻿impossible﻿to﻿provide﻿any﻿confidentiality﻿of﻿messages.﻿We﻿
therefore﻿base﻿our﻿solution﻿on﻿explicit﻿multicast﻿routing,﻿where﻿each﻿destination﻿address﻿is﻿explicitly﻿






Our﻿ proposed﻿ protocol﻿ is﻿ based﻿ on﻿ the﻿Differential﻿Destination﻿Multicast﻿ (DDM)﻿protocol,﻿
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Figure 7. Group communication scenario
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•﻿ Downstream address u:﻿The﻿address﻿of﻿the﻿next-hop﻿neighbour
•﻿ Sequence number:﻿A﻿number﻿used﻿to﻿identify﻿changes﻿in﻿the﻿direction﻿set.
•﻿ Force refresh:﻿ A﻿ flag﻿ indicating﻿whether﻿ destination﻿ list﻿ should﻿ be﻿ refreshed﻿ for﻿ the﻿
downstream﻿neighbour;
•﻿ Forwarding DST addresses:﻿A﻿list﻿of﻿addresses﻿that﻿use﻿the﻿downstream﻿neighbour﻿as﻿next﻿hop;
•﻿ Time:﻿The﻿time﻿until﻿the﻿entry﻿is﻿removed.
7.3. Packet Generation
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e.﻿﻿ Group﻿address﻿ is﻿ set﻿ to﻿ the﻿ selected﻿group﻿description,﻿or﻿ set﻿ to﻿zero﻿ if﻿destinations﻿are﻿
selected﻿outside﻿predefined﻿groups;
f.﻿﻿ SRC﻿address﻿is﻿set﻿to﻿this﻿nodes﻿address;
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8.1. NS-2 Simulation Environment
The﻿Network﻿Simulator﻿II﻿(NS-2)﻿(ns-2 Simulator,))﻿is﻿a﻿popular﻿discrete﻿event﻿simulator﻿targeted﻿for﻿
network﻿research.﻿It﻿provides﻿a﻿comprehensive﻿collection﻿of﻿libraries﻿for﻿modelling﻿and﻿simulating﻿
Table 9. Scaling factors for node types
Node Type Speed Interval Pause Time (t)
Police 1 1 10
Fire 1 2 1
Medic 2 4 4
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MANETs,﻿including﻿mobility﻿models,﻿propagation﻿models,﻿routing﻿protocols﻿and﻿data﻿sources.﻿The﻿
class﻿hierarchy﻿ is﻿ implemented﻿using﻿C++﻿while﻿simulation﻿scripts﻿are﻿written﻿using﻿ the﻿Object﻿
Tcl﻿ (OTcl)﻿ scripting﻿ language.﻿The﻿ rationale﻿ for﻿ using﻿ two﻿ different﻿ languages﻿ is﻿ that﻿ protocol﻿
implementation﻿requires﻿a﻿powerful﻿language﻿generating﻿fast﻿executable﻿code.﻿Defining﻿simulations﻿





















•﻿ Packet delivery ratio:﻿The﻿fraction﻿of﻿data﻿packets﻿sent﻿that﻿are﻿actually﻿received﻿at﻿the﻿destination﻿
node.﻿Packets﻿are﻿counted﻿by﻿the﻿source﻿and﻿final﻿destination﻿such﻿that﻿intermediate﻿forwarding﻿
is﻿not﻿included;
•﻿ End to end delay:﻿The﻿average﻿delay﻿of﻿data﻿packets﻿measured﻿from﻿the﻿time﻿the﻿packet﻿is﻿sent﻿
to﻿the﻿time﻿it﻿is﻿received﻿by﻿the﻿destination﻿node;





Table 10. Throughput and delay due to encryption
Algorithm Throughput MB/s
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Figure 8. Routing overhead (bytes) as function of number of nodes
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Figure 9. Packet drop rate (packets/sec)
Table 11. Fulfillment of security requirements
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We﻿have﻿presented﻿a﻿secure﻿ad﻿hoc﻿network﻿scheme﻿for﻿ first﻿ responders﻿ in﻿a﻿crisis﻿situation﻿ that﻿
provides﻿access﻿control﻿and﻿confidentiality﻿of﻿information,﻿and﻿also﻿offers﻿a﻿group﻿communication﻿
mechanism.﻿This﻿ scheme﻿balances﻿ the﻿need﻿ for﻿protection﻿with﻿ requirements﻿ for﻿availability﻿and﻿
efficiency,﻿and﻿takes﻿advantage﻿of﻿the﻿hierarchical﻿structure﻿of﻿such﻿operations.
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